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CHANGING RULES OF LIABILITY IN AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT LITIGATION
RICHARD M. NIXON*
Thirty-one years ago an enterprising law review commentator discussed in a
four-page article all the reported cases dealing with the tort liability of automobile
drivers.' He predicted that the great number of motor cars, "constantly whizzing
through villages, towns, cities, counties, and across the states are bound to call forth
from the courts judicial utterances peculiar to the automobile's status."'2 The courts
before and since that time, almost without exception, have insisted that the rules of
law applicable to automobile cases, were no different from those which had been
developed in the days of the horse and buggy. But there has, nevertheless, grown
up a large body of law which shows clearly the influence of the automobile and
much of which is applicable only to automobile cases. Thus, though the advocates
of legal reform are directing a steadily increasing stream of criticism at the rules
which govern liability in automobile litigation, at least they cannot damn them all
with that machine-age epithet, "horse and buggy."
So numerous have these changes been that comprehensive, detailed treatment
would call for an encyclopedia, not an article. But so far as generalization can be
hazarded, it may be said that there has been a steady erosion of fault as the ground
of shifting the plaintiff's loss to the defendant. This article will be directed to an
examination of three significant fields of automobile accident law in which the
working of this process is apparent and then deal with a fourth field in which
precisely the opposite trend is evident.3
THE STANDARD OF CARE
Despite the insistent contention of counsel in the early cases4 that the absolute
liability of the keeper of vicious dogs or evilly-disposed mules should be imposed
upon the drivers of "devil wagons,"' the courts from the beginning held that the
*A.B., '934, Whittier College. Now a member of the third year class, Duke University School of
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'Huddy, The Law of Automobiles (1905) 9 LAw NoTEs (Am.) 147.
2 Ibid.
' Because of limited space, no attempt will be made to give exhaustive citations.
'See Blakemore, Is the Law Fair to the Motor Vehicle? (1931) 65 U. S. L. REv. 20, 21.
'So the automobile was once labelled. See Note (i9o6) x L. R. A. (N. S.) 215, 225; (1904) 59 CENT.
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automobile driver should be subject to liability only if his conduct were at fault
and then only to plaintiffs whose conduct was free from fault.6 "Fault" was defined
in terms of a departure from the common law standard of ordinary care. The courts
thereby took upon themselves the problem of determining in each case whether the
parties had exercised the required degree of care. In the days of poor roads and low
speeds, the facts of an accident could be reconstructed in the courtroom with some
degree of accuracy, and the problem of determining fault did not present unusual
difficulties. But with high-powered cars and concrete highways, the probability that
an accident-often the consequence of a fractional mistake in management-can and
will be described accurately in court has become increasingly remote, especially where
court congestion has delayed the time of trial. The consequent uncertainties as to
the facts have given to the jury in those cases where it determines the question of
fault an almost unrestricted power to choose between the litigants at bar. And the
notorious tendency of that body to prefer the plaintiff,7 especially as against the de-
fendant suspected of carrying insurance, has made "taking the case away from the
jury" one of the primary objectives of the defense counsel.
To this end they have invoked the power of the trial judge to direct a verdict
for the defendant if the evidence clearly demonstrates either the plaintiff's fault or
the defendant's freedom from fault. But so long as the standard of care is that which
a reasonable man would have exercised under the circumstances, the opportunity
for such a demonstration is obviously limited. Where, however, the standard of care
governing a specific situation has become crystallized in a rule of law, e.g. that a
driver approaching a railroad crossing must "stop, look, and listen," the power of
the trial judge is materially increased for the evidence may clearly show whether
that standard was observed by the party to whom it is applicable.
It is not surprising then that it has been around the standard of care that some of
the most important battles of automobile tort law have been waged. And the con-
flict has been most acute with respect to the standard of care applicable to the plaintiff.
A specific standard of care is, as a rule, a more rigorous requirement than the general
standard of the "reasonable man." For plaintiff's counsel, already enjoying the favor
of the jury, the need to obtain a directed verdict based upon a proved deviation from
a specific standard is less important than for defendant's counsel who will strive to
wrest the case from the jury by seeking a directed verdict based on the plaintiff's
failure to observe such a standard. It is in the rise and decline of those specific
standards of care most frequently invoked against plaintiffs that change in the rules
of liability in automobile cases can best be marked.8
"Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S. E. 338 (907), is a typical decision refusing to impose
absolute liability on the automobile owner.
Thus in a survey covering courts of four cities it was found that verdicts for plaintiffs were rendered
in approximately two-thirds of the cases. See REPoRT aY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) 34.
"An example of a standard of care invoked against deendants is found in the development of the
rules applicable to the horse-frightening cases. In the early cases, the common law standard of ordinary
care was laid down. But as the number of cases of this type increased, the courts began to lay down exact
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The specific standard of care in civil cases is usually either of judicial creation or
adoption. When a judge has discovered through hearing a number of cases involv-
ing fimilar situations that certain conduct is generally blameworthy he may rule
that A person guilty of such conduct is negligent as a matter of law.0 If the appellate
court approves his ruling, or if that court itself so rules, the standard becomes a rule
of law to be followed in all future cases involving similar facts. A similar power
resides in the legislature, but it has acted principally through the creation of stand-
ards of care by which the crimind liability of an individual is to be measured. How-
ever, in a majority of the states, the courts in civil cases involving legislatively pro-
scribed conduct have ruled that such conduct is negligence as a matter of law.10 In
other states, however, the courts have considered that the violation of the criminal
statute is no mcre than evidence of negligence which the jury may weigh, along
with the other facts of the case, in deciding the fault question.1'
An inquiry into the history of three specific standards which have played an im-
portant part in automobile litigation follows.
x. The Stop, Look, and Listen Rule.
Before the coming of the automobile, many cases had come before the courts
in which the point at issue was whether or not a traveller had exercised due care in
crossing a railroad "track. At first the courts left the standard of care to be defined
by the jury, but gradually judicial standards began to emerge. In the language of
the Supreme Court of California, "The cases arising from injuries suffered at rail-
road crossings have been so numerous, and upon certain points, there has been such
absolute accord, that what will constitute ordinary care in such a ease will have
been precisely defined, and if any element is wanting, the courts will hold as a
matter of law that the plaintiff has been guilty of negligence."12  It was not
until the automobile became a factor in the cases that the greatest development
of judicial standards took place.'3 Courts which had required the driver of the
horse and buggy only to look and listen, adopted as the standard for the auto-
mobile operator, the strict Pennsylvania rule of stopping.14 But as the number of
crossing cases increased, the courts began to make exceptions to the rules they had laid
down, and some ceased to apply absolute standards, holding that each case must
stand on its own facts and that the question of due care should be one for the jury.',
rules for particular situations. Thus it was held to be negligent per se for the automobile driver not to
stop if the driver of the horse signalled him or if the horse appeared frightened. The legislature passed
statutes which were applied in civil cases. Finally a fairly exact set of rules governed the conduct of the
automobile driver in this type of situation, and the driver of the horse had little difficulty in making out
his case. See in general Berry, Rights and Duties of Automobile Drivers when Meeting and Passing
Horse-Drawn Vehicles (x916) 82 CEWr. L. J. 315.
'See HosanEns, Tkm Comm~om LAw (i88r) 122 et seq.
"Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability (1933) 46 HRv. L. REV. 453.
= Ibid.
'See Herbert v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Cal. 227, 230, 53 Pac. 65z (1898).
'See Note (1923) 9 VA. L. Rnv. 317. "'See Note (1928) x6 CAL. L. RaV. 238, 239.
'For examples of cases showing the relaxation of the rule and the exceptions made thereto, see Notes
(i919) i A. L. R. 208; (1926) 41 A. L. R. 420.
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In 1927, in the case of Baltimore and Ohio R. R. u. Goodman,"8 the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, advocated strongly the fixing of definite
standards in such cases. The standard there laid down in a dictum was that where
the plaintiff could not otherwise ascertain whether or not a train was dangerously
near, he should get out of his car. 1 Although the case evoked a great deal of
comment at the time, the trend away from the fixed standards was not noticeably
checked.' 8 In 1934, Justice Cardozo, in Pokora v. Wabash Ry.,19 refused to apply
the standard laid down in the Goodman case. The Court did not, however, as is
sometimes contended, advocate the abandonment of all fixed standards in such cases;
its only quarrel was with the standard which had been laid down. It advised the
use of "caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law-when
there is no'background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. '"
Nevertheless the tendency today is definitely away from the application of fixed
judicial standards in these cases. That statutes in many states impose criminal
liability for failure to stop at a crossing, has had little effect due to the fact that a
great proportion of them expressly stipulate that the rule of civil liability shall not
be affected. 21
2. The Range of Vision Rule
So prevalent once were accidents involving the collision of automobiles with
unlighted horse-drawn vehicles at night, that the Supreme Court of one state held
constitutional a county ordinance entirely prohibiting motor vehicles from travelling
on the highway between dusk and dawn.22 It is not then surprising that as early
as x909 a court laid down a judicial standard to govern a fact situation which was
often involved in these cases. Where an automobile collided with an unlighted
object at night, the driver's conduct was held to be sub-standard as a matter of law
unless he was travelling at such a speed that he could have stopped within the range
of his headlights.23 This rule until recently was that of a majority of the courts,24
and for a time it was applied without material qualification. But as cases came
before the courts wherein an arbitrary application of the rle seemed unjust, the
courts began to make exceptions. Typical of these were the cases where adverse
weather hindered visibility2 5 or where the unexpectedness of the obstruction con-
tributed to the driver's failure to see it.28
Some courts completely abandoned the fixed standard holding that the question
is 275 U. S. 66 (1927).
"Id. at 7o. 18See Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rav. 926, 929.
19292 U. S. 98 0934)- Id. at xo5.
'The statutes are collected in Note (930) 43 HAv. L. REV. 926, 931.
Ex pane Berry, 147 Cal. 523, 82 Pac. 44 (1905).
Lauson v. Town of Fond du Lac, 141 Wirs. 57, 123 N. W. 629 (i9o9).
1 4See (1932) 4 Rocxy MT. L. Rav. z56, x58.
"Woolner v. Perry, 265 Mass. 74, z63 N. E. 750 (1928); Mechler v. McMahon, 184 Minn. 476, 239
N. W. 605 (1931).
mOpple v. Ray, x95 N. E. 8x (Ind. 1935); Jacobs v. Monize, i92 N. E. 515 (Mass. 1934).
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of fault in each case must be decided by the jury.27  In recent years statutes have
been passed in several states providing that a motorist shall not drive at such a speed
that he will be unable to stop within the assured clear distance ahead.28 The courts
have declared that these statutes indicate a legislative intention that the range of
vision rule be adopted as a standard in civil cases.29 If such legislation continues to
find favor in the states, the range of vision rule may regain its former status.
3. Statutory Right of Way at Intersections
In view of the number of intersection collision cases which have come before the
courts, it would be expected that some fairly definite judicial standards of conduct
would have been developed. The courts did lay down the rule that the person reach-
ing the intersection first should be entitled to the right of way.3 0 The standards
applied in these cases have for the most part, however, been set by the legislatures.
In many jurisdictions statutes provide that the person approaching the intersection
from the right shall be entitled to the right of way.31 These statutes would seem to
have established an arbitrary rule of law which would decide the right of litigants in
all intersection cases. But though this exact standard was laid down in some of the early
cases in which the statute was invoked,32 the courts have placed so many qualifications
on the rule, that in most cases, it operates only as one element to be considered by
the jury along with the other facts in determining the standard of care. Thus it is
held that the party having hbe right of way may not exercise it without due regard
for the rights of the other party, since the care to avoid collisions remains reciprocal.
3
Whether the former can rely on the latter's giving him the right of way, is a jury
question dependent on such circumstances as the width of the street, the number of
vehicles crossing the intersection, the scope of the other's view, and the facility with
which each car can be halted or controlled.34 The rule does not apply where the
driver from the left had no knowledge of an obscured crossing. 5 He may assume
that the favored party is travelling at the lawful rate of speed."0 He need surrender
the right of way only when all the circumstances, including the visible conduct of
the favored party, combine to create a situation which would cause a reasonably
'For collection of cases see Comment (1935) 23 CAL. L. REv. 498, 501. Compare Notes (1926) 44
A. L. R. 14o3; (1929) 58 A. L. R. 1493; (1933) 87 A. L. R. 900; (1935) 97 A. L. R. 546, illustrating
the growth of exceptions to the -ule.
'Comment (1935) 23 CAL. L. REV. 498, 502.
"Peckinpaugh v. Engelke, 215 Ia. 1248, 247 N. W. 822 (1933); Skinner v. Penn. R. R., 127 Ohio
St. 69, x86 N. E. 722 (1933).
'Note (925) 37 A. L. R. 493, 494.
'E.g., "Every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public highway road
shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching him from his right, except
where otherwise directed by a traffic officer or a lawful regulation device or signal." N. Y. CoNs. LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c; 6.4-a, §§ 82, 90.
"Brillinger v. OZias, x86 App. Div. 221, 174 N. Y. Supp. 282 (igg), is a particularly strong case.
See also Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 974.
"Fitts v. Marquis, 127 Me. 75, 14o Ad. 909 (1928).
"Ray v. Brannan, 196 Ala. 113, 72 So. x6 (i916). -
'Ramp v. Osborne, xi5 Ore. 673, 239 Pac. zz2 (1925).
'McHugh v. Mason, 154 Wash. 572, 283 Pac. 184 (1929).
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prudent man acting in relation thereto, to apprehend danger in not stopping.37
It is not surprising that a New York court, in commenting on the confusion which
existed regarding the rights of parties at intersections, declared that the statute giving
the right of way to the party approaching from the right was one of the principle
causes thereof.3
Of the standards heretofore discussed, the first two are applicable almost entirely
to the conduct of plaintiffs, and the majority of those cases in which exceptions to
the third have been made were ones in which the rule had been invoked against
the plaintiff."9 Through the gradual demolition of these standards, the jury in an
increasing number of cases has gained the power of determining whether the
plaintiff had been at fault. The jury, however, may not be entirely without scruple
in deciding this question. For according to Judge Ulman of the Baltimore Supreme
Court, where the jury finds that both parties were at fault, it may ignore the court's
instruction to deny recovery to the plaintiff, but it will reduce the damages in
proportion to his fault."
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE INROADS UPON THE FREEDOM FROM FAULT REQUIREMENT
The courts have not confined their attack on the rule that the plaintiff must be
free from fault to the subtle method, discussed in the preceding section, of depriving
the trial judge of specific standards by which he might rescue the defendant from
the fault judgment.of a hostile jury. In using that method, they at least have pro-
ceeded on the assumption that if the jury finds the plaintiff's conduct to have been
sub-standard, he should be barred from recovery. But the opponents of the doctrine
have devised ways of avoiding its harsh effects even where the plaintiff is found
guilty of fault. This section will be devoted to a discussion of those exceptions to
the rule which have proved especially applicable to automobile accident litigation.
I. judicial Exceptions to the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
By the art of definition, the courts had determined before the advent of the auto-
mobile that the plaintiff's contributory negligence will not bar him from recovery
where the defendant's conduct can be classed as wanton, willful or reckless.41 This
result is reached by holding that contributory negligence should be a defense only to
liability based on negligence.4 2 Then, although the courts will not distinguish
'See Note (1931) 3 RocKy MT. L. REv. 143, 147. For other typical exceptions showing that the
rule today is only a relative one to be considered with all other factors, see Note (934) 89 A. L. R. 838
and sources there cited.
'Shuman v. Hall, 246 N. Y. 5r, 54, 158 N. E. 16, 17 (1927).
'2E.g., compare the number of cases in which the plaintiff's breach of the right of way statute was
at issue with those involving defendants in cases abstracted in Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 974; (1925) 37
A. L. R. 493; (1927) 47 A. L. R. 595; (1929) 58 A. L. R. 1197; (1932) 81 A. L. R. 185; (934) 89
A. L. R. 839..
'
5 ULMAN, A JuDGE TAKEs ThE STAND (1933) 3134.
'
1 Note (1932) 32 COL. L. Rav. 493, 500.
'See Lowndes, Contributory Negligence (1934) 22 GFo. L. J. 674, 686, for other exceptions to the
rule based on this premise.
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between degrees of negligence, they find that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct is
different from ordinary negligence not only in degree but also in kind.43 It is said
that willfulness has an element of intentional wrongdoing; that it is the conscious,
as contrasted to the inadvertent, doing of a negligent act.44 But in applying this test
to the conduct of an automobile driver, little more can be done than to allow the
jury to determine whether the defendant was conscious of his wrongdoing whenever
it appears, objectively, that he has been very negligent.
That conventional liability safety valve, the causation analysis, forms the basis
for the most fertile judicial exception to the doctrine of contributory negligence.
Where the plaintiff by an act of negligence places himself in a position of peril, one
who has a "last clear chance" to avoid injuring him and fails to exercise it, is held
liable on the ground that his negligence, not the plaintiff's, was the proximate cause
of the injury, although such a holding normally involves an arrant manipulation of
the rules of causation. Explained also in terms of cause and condition, decisive cause
and inducing cause, active and passive negligence,4" the doctrine of the last clear
chance, has cut deeply into the rule which bars from recovery a plaintiff guilty of
fault. For though a literal interpretation of the doctrine would require knowledge
of the plaintiff's peril by the defendant, giving him an actual last clear chance to
avoid the accident, the greater number of states apply it if the defendant, by the
exercise of care, should have seen and recognized the danger.46 And although the
rationale of the doctrine assumes that the plaintiff's negligence ceased to operate,
some courts allow recovery even where the plaintiff, by the exercise of care, could
have extricated himself from peril.47 Since its application turns on the solution of a
complicated fact problem, the plaintiff's counsel who is able to invoke the doctrine
materially increases his chance to get the case before the jury. Although its applica-
tion to collision cases is considerably limited by the requirement that the plaintiff's
negligence must have ceased to operate at the time of the accident, counsel have
made effective use of it in the crossing cases and in behalf of the jaywalking
pedestrian."
2. Comparative Negligence
The judicial exceptions to the doctrine of contributory negligence have been
criticized because they allow an admittedly negligent plaintiff, whose fault con-
tributed to his injury, to shift the entire burden of his loss to the defendant.49 To
those who believe that liability based on fault is fundamentally unsound as applied
to automobile cases, this criticism presents no difficulties. But if fault is to be the
'Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. v. Baker, 79 Kans. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (igo8), is a leading case.
"See Gibbard v. Cursan, 225 Mich. 311, 320, 196 N. W. 398, 401 (923).
'See Lowndes, supra note 42, at 702 et seq., for discussion of the various reasons advanced for the
exception.
"HARPER, TORTS (1933) §138.
"'The cases -re discussed in Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47, 128. This is sometimes called the
"humanitarian rule."
"I d. at 47 et seq.
'See GREGORY, LEciStmsvx Loss DIsTRIBUTION IN NELIGENcE AcTioNs (1936) 52.
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loss-shifting criterion in determining liability in these cases, it would seem that a
system should be evolved which would alleviate the harshness of both the con-
tributory negligence rule as applied to the plaintiff and the judicial exceptions thereto
as applied to the defendant. It is in this direction that the liability reform pendulum
now seems to be swinging.
Where one party asks that another compensate him for an injury caused by their
joint negligence, the most equitable solution of the problem would be to allow him
to recover only that proportion of the loss for which the other had been responsible.
The courts, however, have consistently refused to apportion loss in negligence actions
at common law."0 The reason usually advanced for this position are that the law will
not settle disputes between wrongdoers 1 and that it has no scales with which to
measure the relative fault of negligent parties. 52 The first has been attacked by
almost every author who has had occasion to discuss contributory negligence.5 3
Especially is it subject to criticism as applied to automobile cases, wherein the
plaintiff's "wrongs" are usually inadvertent and are scarcely ever intentional.
Although the second has more merit, the courts without noticeable difficulty have
apportioned negligence in other fields of the law.54
The legislatures in several states, recognizing the harshness of the contributory
negligence rule in the crossing cases, have provided that the plaintiff's recovery shall
be diminished by the amount his fault contributed to his injury.55 In four states,
the courts are authorized by statute to apportion the loss between plaintiff and de-
fendant according to fault in all negligence actions.55 It is significant that the two
most effective statutes, those of Wisconsin5 and Mississippi,58 have been passed since
the advent of the automobile.
It is doubdess true that in accident cases, the judgment of a jury as to the propor-
tion of the loss for which each party was responsible is at best extremely uncertain
and inaccurate. But if the shifting of loss is to be based on fault, the comparative
negligence statutes at least provide a more rational approach to the problem than
the crude doctrines of the common law.
3. Contribution between Joint Tortfeasors
The same considerations which led the courts to refuse to apply the rule of com-
parative negligence have caused a great majority of them to hold that where one
of two parties, whose joint negligence has caused injury to a third, has been com-
pelled to pay the entire loss, he cannot obtain contribution from his co-tortfeasor. 59
RId. at 53.
'HARPER, TORTS. § 132. See in general as to the reasons behind the contributory negligence doctrine,
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TORTS (1926) 500.
52 GREGORY, Op. cit. supra note 49, at 53.
" E.g., Mole and Wilson, A, Study of Comparative Negligence (1932) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 332, 604.
"id. at 339-359. 'Id. at 518-625.
"The states are Georgia, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Wisconsin. Statutes are collected and discussed
in Mole and Wilson, supra, note 53, at 633 et seq.
"Wis. Laws 1931, C. 242. 'eMiss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1930) §511.
' Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 552.
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The leading case in support of this rule was one wherein the party asking for con-
tribution had been a conscious wrongdoer.60 The courts of four states have dis-
tinguished this case from those wherein the parties were merely negligent, and allow
contribution in the latter. 1 Statutes have been enacted in about one-fourth of the
states, allowing contribution in tort actions where the plaintiff was not an intentional
wrongdoer.62 These decisions and statutes were undoubtedly intended to allow
contribution in automobile accident cases as well as in other negligence actions.
However, one court has held that the breach of a highway safety statute is such con-
scious wrongdoing as will exclude the actor from contribution. 3 Since highway
codes regulate practically every move the automobile driver is likely to make, such
holdings would be fatal to contribution in accident cases.64 It has been suggested that
future statutes should be carefully worded so as to exclude the possibility of this
interpretation. 65
That the growing interest in comparative negligence and contribution legislation
is due mainly to automobile accident litigation, there can be no doubt. Although
such legislation is intended not to destroy but to refine the fault formula for shifting
loss, it is indicative of the general dislike for those harsh rules of the common law
which would deny recovery to all but that rare individual who was entirely free
from fault.
THE OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DuvVER's NEGLIGENCE
In the days when an automobile driver was looked upon with somewhat that
same degree of awe and respect which the airplane pilot inspires in the ordinary
ground dweller of today, the owner did not often entrust his car to others. He either
drove it himself or, since he was usually a man of wealth, employed an experienced
chauffeur. There were few cases, therefore, in which the owner's liability for
injuries caused by the negligent operation of his automobile could not be predicated
either on his own fault or on that of his regularly employed servant. Once the
novelty of the new machines began to wear off and the members of the owner's
family discovered that operating the family automobile was not much more difficult
and a great deal more thrilling than driving the family horse, cases arose in which
the owner's liability codld not so readily be fitted into traditional legal formulas.
With the coming of the present era when the loaning of automobiles both gratui-
tously and for hire is an ordinary occurrence, plaintiffs in an increasing number
of cases have asked the courts to hold a solvent automobile owner liable for the
negligence of a financially irresponsible driver.
63 Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186, iox Eng. Repr. 1337 (K: B. 1799).
'
5 Bohlen, loc. cit. supra note 59.
'The statutes are collected in Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortleasors (1932) 81
U. oF PA. L. REv. 13o n. 6o.
'Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 236 N. W. 68 (193).t Leflar, supra note 62, at 144.
'Id. at 145; GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 49, at 141.
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In no other branch of automobile law have the courts shown more willingness
to stretch the legal formulas at their command in order to reach desired results than
in dealing with this problem. By refusing to classify the automobile as a dangerous
instrumentality,6 they deprived themselves of the most effective legal tool by which
liability on the owner could have been imposed. Forced to use more conventional
formulas, they have, nevertheless, in a surprisingly large number of cases, succeeded
in finding some ground on which to hold the owner liable.
I. The Owner's Liability for Choosing an Incompetent Driver
Although the courts refuse to classify the automobile as a dangerous instrumen-
tality, they recognize that it may become dangerous unless carefully driven.7
Therefore the owner may subject himself to liability if he knowingly entrusts his car
to a driver who is incompetent for want of age or experience,68 or who has a rep-
utation for recklessness. 69 The scope of this liability is greatly limited due to the
difficulty of proving the owner's knowledge of the driver's inefficiency. The courts
have made use of several devices in an attempt to aid the plaintiff in this respect.
Thus it has been held that it is enough if the owner had every reason to believe
that the driver was incompetent.70 A father who knows that his son is addicted to
drinking cannot escape liability for accidents caused by the son's drunken driving.71
Where the driver is below the legal age the courts are likely to leave the question of
knowledge to the jury.72 One who rents automobiles must make reasonable efforts
to determine whether or not the prospective renter is a competent operator.r3
Although the courts insist that the owner is held liable in this situation only for his
own negligence, a study of the opinions will disclose that the liability imposed is
in fact based on the driver's negligence, and that finding the owner negligent is in
most cases merely a convenient method of insuring compensation to the plaintiff.
2. The Owner's Liability under the Master-Servant Formula
The rule that a master should be liable for the torts of his servants was first laid
down almost two hundred years before the invention of the automobile. 74 But the
limits to which it might be extended were not realized until the courts began 'to
look for convenient pegs on which to fasten the liability of the automobile owner for
a driver's negligence. For even in those jurisdictions which do not recognize that
most startling extension of the rule, the family purpose doctrine, the courts have
been liberal in fitting individual cases into the traditional master-servant formula.
'Florida, until 1931, did impose liability on the owner on this ground. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Anderson, 8o Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (592o). For the present Florida rule, see Brown, A Comment on the
Duties and Responsibilities of a Motor Vehicle Owner in Florida (1932) 5 FLA. STATE BAR Ass,,. L. J. 469.
'Allen v. Bland, x68 S. W. 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
18 Ibid.
'Jones v. Harris, 122 Wash. 69, 21o Pac. 22 (1922).
"Robertson v. Aldridge, 185 N. C. 292, 116 S. E. 742 (1923).
'Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 459, 134 S. E. 576 (1926).
"aCases collected in Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1137, 1150.
"Anderson v. Driverless Cars, xx La. App. 515, 124 So. 32 (929).
' Jones v. Hart (1698) Holt, K. B. 642, 90 Eng. Repr. 1225.
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Thus it is held that the owner's presence in the automobile will create a strong
inference that a master and servant relationship existed between him and the
driver. 5 Where the driver is a member of his family the inference is almost con-
clusive.7 ' Although the courts generally talk in terms of power and right to control
in justifying the imposition of liability,7" its real basis is probably more nearly ex-
pressed by this language of the Supreme Court of Maine used in reference to the
automobile owner: "You shall not be permitted to shuffle yourself down to the
bottom of the pack as a mere passenger and turn up a probably impecunious and
irresponsible driver as the only person subject to legal liability.78
The requirement that the servant must have been acting within the scope of his
employment provides a convenient loophole through which the master can escape
liability, but some courts have gone far in holding him liable in such cases.70 Need-
less to say, the jury co6perates in this endeavor. The difficulty of proving that the
driver and owner were servant and master, and that the servant was acting in the
scope of his employment, has been greatly alleviated in a majority of jurisdictions
by the fact that the courts hold that proof of ownership is prima facie evidence of
the owner's responsibility for the driver's negligence.80 Unless this presumption is
met by the evidence of disinterested witnesses, the case will go to the jury.8,
3. The Owner's Liability under the Family Purpose Doctrine
So radical an extension of the traditional agency formula is the family purpose
doctrine that it has been described as a new form of tort liability evolved by the
courts in order to increase the owner's responsibility for the automobile driver's
negligence. That the courts, to a degree, have recognized this fact is illustrated by
the language used in the leading case of King v. Smythe,"2 "We think the practical
administration of justice between the parties is more the duty of the court than the
preservation of some esoteric theory concerning the law of principal and agent."'
The term, family purpose doctrine, is a misleading one. For in those jurisdic-
tions where liability will be imposed only under strict agency rules, a master-servant
relationship may be found, if the driver was using the car for a family purpose, in
7Smith v. Wells, 326 Mo. 525, 31 S. W. (2d) 1014 (1930).
"'Haigh v. Hill, 65 Cal. App. 517, 224 Pac. 474 (1924).
'E.g., Fuller v. Metcalf, z5 Me. 77, 130 At. 875 (1925).
'AId. at 81, 13o At. at 87?.
'Where a servant, without authority, allows another to drive the automobile, the negligence of the
other may be imputed to the master if the servant was in the car when the accident occurred. Cf. Grant
v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 65o (1927). Although it is well established that the master will
not be liable where the servant is on a frolic of his own, the courts have realized to a degree that the
servant entrusted with an automobile is placed in such a position that at least some deviations from the
line of duty should be expected by the master. Thus the deviation may be classed only as a detour if
the servant was pursuing a general course necessary to accomplish the master's business. Healy v.
Cockrill, 133 Ark. 327, 202 S. W. 229 (1918); see, further, Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 COL.
L. REv. 444, 716.
'For an excellent article showing the effect of the automobile on the adoption of this rule in the state,
see Fegan, Presumption versus Proof in Automobile Highway Accidents (1934) 22 Gao. L. J. 750.
'
1Miller v. Service and Sales, Inc., 149 Ore. 11, 38 P. (2d) 995 (1934).
62 4o Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (I918). Id. at 226, 204 S. NY. at 298.
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the strict sense of the term. Thus where other members of the family were riding
in the car, the courts have found that the driver was acting as a chauffeur s 4 And
if the driver, though riding alone, was running a family errand, such as making a
purchase of food, the owner will be held liable under strict agency rules.8 5  It is
only when the driver is using the car not for a purpose beneficial to the family, but
for his own pleasure, that the case will not fit into the traditional agency formula.
It is in defining the family purpose that the courts disagree. Those who would hold
the owner liable where the driver was using the car solely for his own pleasure,
declare that the business of providing pleasure and recreation for members of the
family is as much a family purpose as that of providing food and clothing."6 The
fallacies in this line of reasoning have been pointed out by the New York Court of
Appeals: "We have never heard it argued that a man who kept for family use a
horse and wagon, a boat, or set of golf sticks had so embarked upon the occupation
of furnishing pleasure to members of his family that if sometime he permitted one
of them to use one of those articles for his personal enjoyment, the latter was engaged
in carrying out not his own purpose but as agent the business of his father." 87
However weak it may be when measured in terms of established legal formulas,
the doctrine has proved an effective weapon, in those courts which recognize it,
for imposing liability upon the owner of the family automobile. These courts have
been as liberal in interpreting the rules for its application as they were in defining
the family purpose. Thus, a husband who gave a car to his wife was held liable
under the doctrine although he had no property interest therein." Although, the
husband is the head of the family, at least in the eyes of the law, a wife has been
held liable for her husband's negligence in driving her car.8 9 A car purchased for
business purposes, may come within the rule if it is at times used for the family's
pleasure.90 The owner's family, broadly defined in one case as including all the
members of a collective body of persons living in one household and under one
roof,91 has been held to include a partially self-supporting adult son living with his
parents,9 2 a housekeeper, employed for a number of years by a priest,93 and parents
living with their children. 94 It may be found that the owner impliedly consented
to the use where he expressly prohibits a child from driving, if his passive acquies-
cence thereto is subsequently given; 95 where the permission is restricted and the
driver exceeds it, the court may leave to the jury the question of substantial com-
84Missell v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348, 91 Ad. 322 (1914).
'McCaffrey v. Lukens, 67 Pa. Super. 231 (1917).
'Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922).
" See Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. I 1, X15, 115 N. E. 443, 445 (1917).
8' Cohen v. Hill, 286 S. W. 66, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
'Venghis v. Nathanson, ioi N. J. L. i5O, 127 Ad. 175 (925).
'Watson v. Burley, io5 W. Va. 516, 143 S. E. 95 (1928).
"g smart v. Bissonette, xo6 Conn. 447, 138 Ad. 365 (1927).
"Watson v. Burley, supra note 9o . "Smart v. Bissonette, supra note 95.
"Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 209 N. W. 626 (1926).
Wallace v. Squires, 186 N. C. 338, ri9 S. E. 569 (1923).
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pliance.96 And liability may be imposed on the owner where the accident occurred
while the car was being used for an expressly forbidden purpose. °7
These cases, though they illustrate the extremes to which the doctrine has been
carried, indicate that the courts which recognize it are concerned more with the
desirability of insuring recovery to injured plaintiffs than they are with maintaining
the symmetry and balance of traditional liability patterns.
4. Statutory Extensions of the Owner's Liability.
A number of those who have criticized the attempted legal rationale of the family
purpose doctrine have, nevertheless, commended the courts which follow it for their
refusal to allow traditional legal formulas to stand in the way of needed reforms.98
If the subsequent history of the owner's liability for the driver's negligence is any
criterion, the wisdom of such judicial legislation is open to serious doubt. In re-
cent years statutes have been enacted extending the owner's liability to all cases
where the car was driven with his consent.99  Of the six states' 00 in which
legislation of this character has been adopted, in only one, 1" had the courts, prior
thereto, recognized the family purpose doctrine. This would seem to indicate that
the need for such legislation, imposing an exceedingly broad liability, has been more
keenly felt in those states where the courts refused to extend the liability of the
owner beyond the recognized common law limits, than in those where they at-
tempted a partial solution of the problem by holding the owner liable in a substantial
but limited group of cases through the application of the family purpose doctrine.
However, the courts have construed these statutes so strictly that there is still a fairly
large group of cases which do not fall within their scope.
It is generally held that they are not applicable where the relationship of master
and servant exists 'between the owner and driver.10 2  Thus the master's freedom
from liability where the servant acts outside the scope of his authority is not affected.
The term owner is generally held not to include a conditional vendor or chattel
mortgagee.' 03  The consent requirement is much more strictly construed than under
the family purpose doctrine. Where the driver keeps the car beyond a named
hour' 0 4 or where he drives to a different place from the one authorized,0 °  the owner
Johnson v. Evans, 141 Minn. 356, 17o N. W. 220 (i919).
"McDowcll v. Hurner, 142 Ore. 617, 20 P. (2d) 395 (1933).
'E.g., see McCall, The Family Automobile (93o) 8 N. C. L. REv. 256, 270.
'°For collection of statutes and discussion of their scope, see Heyting, Automobiles and Vicarious
Liability (1930) z6 A. B. A. J. 225; Reno, Imputed Negligence in Automobile Bailments (1934) 82 U. 0V
PA. L. REv. 253, 219-225.
' California, Iowa, Michigan, New York, and Rhode Island have thi; type of statute. Massachusetts
with its compulsory insurance act, obtains the same result. See Reno, supra note 99, at 224.
"'1 Iowa. See McCall, supra note 98, at 256.
1
"Psota v. Long Island R. Co., 246 N. Y. 388, r59 N. E. 18o (1927).
'
5 Lcnnon v. L. A. W. Acceptance Corp., 48 R. I. 363, 138 Ad. 215 (1927).
'Union Trust Co. v. American Commercial Car Co., 2z9 Mich. 557, 189 N. W. 23 (1922).
'2'Chaika v. Vanderberg, a52 N. Y. 0i!, 169 N. E. 103 (929).
CHANGING RULES oF LIABILITY
may be relieved from liability, and where the car is loaned for a specific purpose the
owner is not liable if it is used for another.10 6
The necessity for judicial and legislative extensions of the owner's liability is
today rapidly diminishing. Only when the owner is financially responsible, will the
plaintiff desire to pursue his remedies against him rather than the driver. It can
be said, without fear of contradiction, that the great majority of financially respon-
sible automobile owners today carry casualty insurance. Most of these policies now
contain an "omnibus" clause, which extends the coverage to all who drive the car
with the owner's consent.' 0 7 Very possibly the inclusion of this clause has to a con-
siderable degree been induced by the increased responsibility which courts and
legislatures have imposed upon the automobile owner.
THm AUTOMOBILE GUEST
Having witnessed in the preceding sections the gradual undermining of those
portions of the common law fault formula which bar the paths of plaintiffs to re-
covery, it is somewhat surprising to discover that a rising tide of decisions and
statutes is now threatening to engulf completely the common law rights and remedies
of a special class of accident victims, automobile guests. A survey of the history of
host-guest litigation may reveal some of the factors which have caused the courts
and legislatures to make this discrimination.
The driver of the horse and buggy owed to his guest the common law duty of
ordinary care.' 0 8  Except in the courts of Massachusetts,'0 9 the same standard was
applied in the early cases to the conduct of the automobile host. Through some of
the opinions, however, there runs an undercurrent of judicial aversion to host-guest
litigation. It was felt that the act of an owner of a car in loaning its "comfort and
pleasure to his less fortunate neighbor ... was a species of hospitality which should
be encouraged ... and that the law should not couple with the friendly act a duty
which makes its exercise an unreasonable hazard."110  Beginning approximately in
x920, the volume of host-guest litigation greatly increased."' Close friends and
relatives seemed to forget the social niceties and without reluctance heC.11t' opponents
in the court room. The courts, however, looking beyond the litigants at bar, dis-
covered that there had also been a great increase in casudlty'-insuraince.' l" Realizing
1
'Heavilin v. Wendell, 214 Iowa 844, 241 N. W. 654 (932). In additiot k, the states which have
comprehensive statutes of this type, others have enacted legislation which deals only with some of the
most pressing aspccts of the general problem. For discussion of statutory liability for the accident,, of
minors, see Legis. (1935) 4 8 HAv. L. REv. 498. Connecticut, Maine, and New Jersey are among the
states which impose vicarious liability on those who rent cars. See Reno, loc. cit. supra note 99.
'0TFor the effect of this clause, and the consent required thereunder. see Note (1935) 82 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 765. Several states require by statute that this clause be included in all policies. See Legis.
(1933) 8 Wis. L. REV. 349.
"'aSeveral of the cases are discussed in Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 103 Atl. 4 (1918).
'Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 188 N. E. 168 (1917), (requiring the guest to prove gross
negligence by host).
"O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 459, 185 N. WV. 525, 527 (1921).
"'See White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger (1934) 20 VA. L.
REv. 326, 332. Ibid.
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the high possibility of collusion in such cases, they began to place restrictiofis upon
the guest's right to recover. What would constitute contributory negligence or as-
sumption of risk on his part was no longer left entirely to the judgment of the jury,
but was spelled out into exact rules by the appellate courts in order that the trial
judge might more often decide the fault issue.113 In three states the Massachusetts
common law rule requiring the guest to prove his host grossly negligent, was adopted
by the courts.114 In 1927, the legislatures, influenced perhaps by both the vexatious
character of host-guest litigation and the insurance lobbies, began to place stringent
limitations upon the common law rule. During the past nine years seventeen states
have adopted statutes which allow recovery to a guest only if his host has been guilty
of conduct more blameworthy both in degree and in quality than ordinary negli-
gence. 115 Most of these statutes require the guest to prove that his host had shown
a reckless disregard for the rights of others. 1 ' Some provide that the host's conduct
must have been willful or intentional," 7 others that it must have been grossly
negligent.11 Only the rights of the non-paying guest are thus limited." 9
It has been said that the obvious purpose of this legislation is to deny recovery to
the social guest unless his host has been so neglectful of his safety that the guest owes
him no gratitude' 20 However, there is little doubt but that the legislatures have
been influenced more by the possibilities of collusion between an insured host and
his guest than by their dislike for the ungracious guest.' 2 '
The history of liability in automobile accident litigation discloses a definite trend
away from the strict fault concepts of the common law. The courts, though speak-
ing always in terms of fault, have at times stretched the traditional formulas to the
breaking point in order to insure recovery to an injured plaintiff. In this respect
they have found an always willing ally in the jury. Nor have the legislatures
proved reluctant to aid them. Yet the decisions and statutes restricting the rights of
the automobile guest indicate that, where reinforced by the average man's dislike of
the ingrate or of collusion in fraud, the concept of fault has gained, rather than lost,
in vitality.
"uSee cases collected in Mechem, The Contributory Negligence of Atomobile Passengers (930) 78
U. op PA. L. Ray. 736, 740.
"'They are Georgia (Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, xo6 S. E. 297 (192)); Washington (Saxe v.
Terry, E40 Wash. 504, 250 Pac. 27 (1920)) and Virginia (Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, x6o S. E. 77
(1930)).
1'The statutes are collected in White, supra note iii, at 326-327.
"'E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §1628.
'
7 E.g., Calif. Laws 1931, p. 1693. 'E.g., Ore. Sess. Laws 1929, 5550.
'As to who is a guest within these statutes, see Notes (1933) 82 A.- L. R. 1365; (1935) 95 A. L. R.
118o. 'See Note (1933) 18 CoRN. L. Q. 621, 622.
'See language of court justifying such legislation in Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 224, 234
N. W. 581, 584 (1931).
